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Consider the following problem: There are four individuals differing with re-
spect to two characteristics. First, Anne and Bob received a low bequest (1),
while Ruth and Shmuel received a high bequest (3). Second, Anne and Ruth
are females and as such show more dedication (3) than Bob and Shmuel (1) to
the painstaking task of transforming money into utility. Assume that all actors
have the following utility function:
well¡being Æ(bequestÅtransf er)¢dedication. (1)
The problem is to design a fair transfer scheme, i.e., a reallocation of the aggre-
gate monetary endowment such that reasonable principles of fair division are
respected.
In response to Rawls (1971) seminal contribution to political philosophy, the
idea of luck egalitarianism or responsibility-sensitive egalitarianism has gained
considerable popularity. While, naturally, there is extensive debate on the de-
tails, the main content of this idea is nicely captured by the following quote:
“Distributive justice does not recommend any intervention by soci-
ety to correct inequalities that arise through the voluntary choice or
fault of those who end up with less, so long as it is proper to hold the
individuals responsible for the voluntary choice of faulty behavior
that gives rise to the inequalities.” (Arneson 1990, 176)
Applied to the above example this suggests a transfer scheme which compen-
sates for inequalities due to bequests, since these are clearly outside of the
responsibility sphere of the actors. Let us call things outside of the responsi-
bility sphere circumstances and things that we hold individuals responsible for
responsibility characteristics. Then, we have just stumbled upon the compensa-
tion principle which states that two actors with same responsibility characteris-
tics should enjoy equal well-being. Consequently, transf erBob¡transf erShmuel
Æ2 and transf erAnne ¡transf erRuth Æ2.
The compensation principle is one of the two main topics of Fleurbaey’s
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not determine an unique transfer scheme. For example, an anti-dedication
scheme could assign Bob a transfer of 3. The compensation principle requires
that Shmuel receives a transfer of 1, and feasability together with compensa-
tion leads to transfers of ¡1 and ¡3 for Anne and Ruth, respectively. Of course,
starting with a transfer of ¡1 for Bob we come up with the symmetrical pro-
dedication policy.
The second main principle studied by Fleurbaey is termed liberal reward or
neutrality and states that no actor should be envious of another actor with same
circumstances regarding his bundle of circumstances and money. In our simple
setting this breaks down to transf erBob Æ transf erAnne and transf erShmuel Æ
transf erRuth. Now, combining both sets of inequalities and feasability yields
the unique transfer scheme where Bob and Anne obtain 1, respectively, and
Shmuel and Ruth loose 1, respectively.
It is crucial to note that actually both principles, i.e., compensation and neu-
trality, follow from the famous no-envy test, the cornerstone of the economic
theory of fairness (e.g. Moulin 1995), applied to bundles of money and circum-
stances. Here, a monetary allocation is envy-free iff there is no actor who would
be better off with the money and the circumstances of another actor. Such envy-
free allocations are quite appealing, since the absence of envy can be considered
as an epiphenomenon of fairness, and the only envy compatible with this kind
of no-envy arises if an actor envisions himself with the responsibility character-
istics of another actor. However, the very notion of responsibility characteristics
means that we hold him responsible for them and consequently responsible for
his possibly envious state.
Economists have embraced the no-envy test because it allows to deﬁne the
fairness of allocations solely in terms of ordinal and non-comparable individual
preferences. Put differently, the no-envy test allows us to talk about fairness
without making recourse to dingy notions such as intersubjective comparisons
of utility. We come back to this point in a moment, for now we keep in mind that
there is a close connection between the no-envy test from economics and luck
egalitarianism.
The problem with no-envy free allocations is that if we require these alloca-
tions to be Pareto efﬁcient as well, they need not exist. For instance, let the cir-
cumstances and responsibility characteristics of Anne, Bob, Ruth, and Shmuel
be as before and assume that the utility function is
well¡being Æ transf erÅ(bequest¢dedication). (2)
Now, Anne’s transfer must be 6 monetary units greater than Shmuel’s, otherwise
she is envious. At the same time, Shmuel envies Anne, if his transfer is more
than 2 monetary units smaller than Anne’s, a contradiction. Since hunting envy-
free allocations is a rather quixotic enterprise in many contexts, Fleurbaey, who
has a serious interest in economic applications, studies two families of transfer
schemes, one favouring the compensation principle, the other at sides with neu-
trality. Unfortunately, his favourite concept, the Egalitarian Equivalent (Pazner
and Schmeidler 1978), is not too easy to grasp intuitively:10 Andreas Tutic
Consider a counterfactual situation, in which everybody has identical cir-
cumstances. In this situation, no-envy requires that everybody obtains the same
transfer. So, in this counterfactual, luck egalitarian situation everybody ob-
tains a certain utility payoff, depending on his responsibility characteristics.
The Egalitarian Equivalent seeks to achieve a payoff distribution in the actual
situation via transfers that equals this luck egalitarian payoff distribution.
From this description it is clear that the Egalitarian Equivalent always satis-
ﬁes the compensation principle, since two actors with equal responsibility char-
acteristics obtain the same well-being in the counterfactual situation, and hence
in the actual situation. Whether some form of neutrality is warranted depends
on the way we let the choice of the reference, counterfactual circumstances de-
pend on the problem at hand. If, for instance, we always choose mean circum-
stances as reference, this member of the family of Egalitarian Equivalent trans-
fer schemes satisﬁes a minimal form of neutrality: If all actors have identical
circumstances, they obtain the same transfer.
By and large these are the major theoretical underpinnings of Fleurbaey’s
monograph. These concepts are applied to a variety of contexts providing sub-
stantive and insightful results, some of which are more interesting for econo-
mists, others more interesting for scholars of political philosophy. The ﬁrst ap-
plication is devoted to the primary concern of public economics, i.e., the deduc-
tion of a reasonable system of income taxation. Roughly speaking, the set-up of
this exploration is as follows: Actors have differential productivity, a character-
istic which they are not held responsible for, and different preferences, a char-
acteristic belonging to the responsibility sphere. First, it is demonstrated how
the conﬂict between compensation and liberal reward crops up in this particu-
lar environment, then the properties of various taxations schemes leaning to-
wards compensation or neutrality, respectively, are studied using the axiomatic
method. It turns out that the traditional approach of dealing with the non-
existence of envy-free schemes, i.e., the recourse to the so-called ‘wealth-fair’
and ‘full-income-fair’ solutions, is rather unsatisfactory, since these are extreme
members of the family of solutions leaning towards neutrality. This negative
result is not too troubling because on the positive side Fleurbaey impressively
demonstrates how appealing members from the family of Egalitarian Equiva-
lent solutions can be used to evaluate the ethical merits of tax reforms. For
example, the Zero Egalitarian Equivalence welcomes any reform that raises the
minimum (basic) income, an idea that attracts quite a lot scholars from political
philosophy and social policy (e.g. Van Parijs 1995).
Our second example for the fruitfulness of Fleurbaey’s conceptual apparatus
in applications is of more philosophical nature. One chapter deals extensively
with various aspects of Dworkin’s (2000) version of luck egalitarianism, in par-
ticular his critical distinction between option luck and brute luck and the hypo-
thetical insurance market. Concerning the ﬁrst topic, recall that Dworkin holds
actors responsible for option luck, i.e., lotteries they ‘buy’ voluntarily, but not
for brute luck. For example, if full insurance for car accidents is available and
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of a serious injury, because the availability of insurance signiﬁes a situation of
option luck. Fleurbaey ﬁrmly rejects the idea that actors can be held responsi-
ble for the outcomes of lotteries, since these are clearly outside of their control.
For him, option luck is inacceptable as a conceptual notion. Still, some of the
solutions leaning towards the principles of compensation or neutrality, respec-
tively, applied to a highly original framework designed by Fleurbaey to study
such questions do not involve full compensation for bad luck. Hence, option luck
somehow enters the stage through the back door, not as a doubtful conceptual
notion, but as a property of transfer schemes.
With respect to the hypothetical insurance market Fleurbaey comes up with
a similar criticism like Roemer (1985) when he shows that the utilitarian ﬂavor
of insurance markets might violate the compensation principle. More precisely,
Fleurbaey studies a setting where luck determines both feasible consumption
and utility from consumption. It is true that two actors with identical charac-
teristics and ‘symmetrical’ prospects in the birth lottery have identical ex ante
utility expectations when insurance is available. However, from an application
of the ﬁrst welfare theorem it follows that market equilibria imply that the sum
of the ex post utilities is maximized. Now, suppose Ruth and Shmuel have suf-
ﬁciently identical characteristics such that this result is applicable and poor
Shmuel looses in the birth lottery with the consequence that he is worse than
Ruth in transforming consumption in utility. Given this scenario, maximizing
the sum of their utilities tends to lead to higher utility levels for Ruth than
Shmuel, violating the compensation principle from an ex post perspective.
Hopefully, these two examples convince the reader that this monograph con-
tains some material deserving attention. In fact, it is full with it. Another
interesting chapter, entitled ‘Fresh Starts’, deals with ethical consequences of
changes in preferences during the course of life. Should we help the imprudent
who spent all their endowment in the ﬁrst half of their life and now feel regret,
or would this unduly penalize the more steady-minded amongst us? Fleurbaey
pleads for forgiveness and works out the details in a highly stylized model.
After all, the reader may be unsatisﬁed: Such a long review, so little criticism.
However, the simple truth is that Fleurbaey’s monograph is a paradigmatic mas-
terpiece for the fruitful combination of philosophy and the axiomatic method in
an area of highest interest for the social sciences, just like John Roemer’s (1996)
‘Theories of Distributive Justice’. In another paper, Fleurbaey writes: “[...]
what is proposed in this paper is a closer cooperation between political philoso-
phers, social choice theorists, and public economists, in the ‘assembly line’ of just
institutions. The ﬁrst would provide the fairness principles. The second would
formulate axioms embodying the principles, and derive social preferences. The
third would ﬁnd the institutions that are the best according to such preferences.”
(2007a, 17) From this review it should be clear that Fleurbaey, together with his
collaborators such as Francois Maniquet, has made substantial contributions to
the research program sketched in his quote.
If there is any problem with this monograph, then it is the fact that it is too
short. Ironically, a champion of social choice has written a book full of philosophy12 Andreas Tutic
and public economics which somehow neglects the foundation of his approach in
social choice. To be sure, there is a lot of axiomatizing social ordering functions
in this monograph. However, little is said on the connection between the fair-
ness approach he advocates and the most fundamental issue in social choice,
i.e., Arrow’s (1963) impossibility theorem. Recall, Arrow’s theorem was typically
interpreted to suggest that social ordering functions which rely solely on ordinal
and non-comparable preferences are impossible. In contrast to prominent alter-
natives (e.g. Sen 1979; Roemer 1993), the distinguished feature of Fleurbaey’s
approach is the fact that it works without interpersonal comparisons of utility.
Given Arrow’s impossibility theorem, this raises the question how this is actu-
ally possible. Of course, Fleurbaey has the answer, but he supplies no thorough
exposition of this issue in his book. The same could be criticized with respect
to the so-called indexing dilemma (Fleurbaey 2007b). In a nutshell, we feel that
Fleurbaey was too restrictive in selecting the material for his monograph. That’s
not too bad, because fortunately we can still read his papers.
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